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the Role of Time
1. INTRODUCTION
Thisstudy examines the demand for medical services by type of
provider with particular emphasis on the role of time as a determin-
ing factor. The demand for health and medical services has at-
tracted considerable interest in recent years because of the drama-
tic increase in health expenditures and because of substantial cost
inflation in that sector. Although the causes of this rise in demand
and cost inflation are complex to analyze, there is reason to believe
that the substantial spread of reimbursement insurance in the last
twenty years has played a major role by reducing the out-of-pocket
money price the consumer faces in buying medical care.' Health
research is focusing more and more on the economic determinants
This report was sponsored by the New York City Health Services Administration and the U.S.
Office of Economic Opportunity as R-1151-OEOINYC. I would like to thank Y. Ben-Porath, D.
DeTray, A. Ginsberg, M. Grossman, H. Luff, C. Morris, J. Newhouse, L. Orr, C. Phelps, Ii
Zeckhauser, and the two discussants for useful comments and suggestions at various stages of
this work. The views expressed here are those of the author and not necessarily those of The
Rand Corporation or its sponsors.
165of this demand, explicitly including third-party expenses.2 Surpris-
ingly, there has been almost no discussion of alternative rationing
mechanisms that might become effective if money prices continue
to decrease in importance as a result of spreading third-party
reimbursement. Since there is every reason to believe that money
prices will continue to decline in relative importance because of(1)
the secular trend in third-party coverage, (2) the rising opportunity
cost of time, (3) increases in time required to receive care, and,
perhaps most important, (4) the prospect of national health insur-
ance, it is necessary to examine other factors that may control
demand.
This paper suggests that travel time and waiting time may replace
money prices as the chief determinant of demand.3 First, a model of
the demand for medical services is developed with time explicitly
included as part of the price of the goods purchased. From the
model we predict that the time-price elasticity of demand for
medical services will exceed the money-price elasticity as out-of-
pocket money prices decrease, and also that changes in time prices
will have a greater effect on demand for free medical services than
on the demand for non-free services. We can further predict a
differential effect of earned and non-earned income on the demand
for medical services. A rise in non-earned income increases the
demand for medical services; the effect of a rise in earned income
cannot be predicted because it produces both an income and a price
effect (by raising the opportunity cost of time).
The data used to test the predictions of this model were taken
from two household surveys conducted in New York City. The city
is a particularly good laboratory to estimate the importance of time
prices and possible behavior under national health insurance
because of the long-standing availability of free ambulatory and
inpatient care through municipal hospitals and clinics. Thus, we
get some notion of the steady-state behavior of a population with
free, governmentally sponsored care available. Demand equations
are estimated for four types of medical care: public ambulatory,
private ambulatory, public inpatient, and private inpatient. In
addition to a number of controlling variables for health and
sociodemographic status, the important explanatory variables in-
clude travel and waiting times for alternative sources of care, and
earned and non-earned income. The results indicate that in low-
income neighborhoods of New York City, time-price elasticities
already exceed the money-price elasticity of demand for care.
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167 Demand for Health Care among the Urban Poor
with regard to locating health facilities, queuing practices at am-
bulatory facilities, and the possibility of substituting income sub-
sidies for subsidies for medical services.
2.CONSUMPTION MODEL OF THE DEMAND FOR
MEDICAL SERVICES
Detailsof the model and its implications are described in Appendix
3;4themajor predictions are summarized here. The model concen-
trates on the role of money prices, time prices, and earned and
non-earned income in determining the demand for medical care.
The empirical section concentrates on demand for care from public
and private providers of ambulatory and inpatient care. For simplic-
ity, the formal model is developed in terms of only one provider of
services, but the implications for several providers can easily be
drawn.
Assume that two goods enter the individual's utility function:
medical services, m,anda composite, X, for all other goods and
services. Assuming fixed proportions of money and time to con-








all other goods and services
out-of-pocket money price per unit of medical services
own-time input per unit of medical services consumed
money price per unit of X




total amount of time available for market and own production of
goods and servicesFirst, notice that the consumption of medical services, m, does That is! t]
not affect the amount of time available for production, T.5 Second, equals
is the out-of-pocket expenditure for a unit of medical services, siiaret
incorporating any deductible and coinsurance rate the individual two elasti
faces from insurance. It would be appealing to make these insur- namely, t
ance parameters endogenous, but data limitations do not permit the
c
estimationof demand for insurance along with the demand for as wtp.
services.6 Third, the manner in which the goods produce utility is elasticity
not specified. Some researchers have included "health" in the the out-o
utility function and allowed health to be produced by combining because
medical services with other inputs.7 Health enters because of a of subsid
demand for the "healthy days" it will cause. The interested reader changes i
may consult Phelps (1972) or Grossman (1972a) for these alternative for free n
motivations of the demand for medical services. For present pus- time pnc
poses, an understanding of this mechanism is not necessary. The greater p
simpler formulation used here yields most of the same predictions
as the other specifications. Furthermore, the data do not allow us to
estimate the manner in which medical services are translated into
health. Effects
ofaChange in Price effectsar
Assumptionssufficient to make money function as a price in cient to r
determining the demand for medical services are also sufficient to that an ii
make time function as a price.8 Therefore, the first prediction the dem
derived from this model is that if medical services are a normal income i:
good, time will function as a price, producing negative own-time/ of demar
price elasticities of demand and positive cross-time/price elas- The ef
ticities. priori be
One of my chief interests in this study is the relative importance hour pro
of money and time prices in determining the demand for medical also rais
services. If we let ITequalthe total price per unit of medical time-inte
services (that is,iT=p + wt), then the elasticity of demand for services











IThat is, the elasticity with respect to one component of the price
equals the elasticity with respect to the total price weighted by the
share of the total price owing to that component. Comparing these
two elasticities yields the second prediction from the formal model;
namely, that
lmt<imp
as wtp. Clearly, as p falls to zero and wt does not, the time-price
elasticity will exceed the money-price elasticity. In other words, as
the out-of-pocket payment for a unit of medical services falls,
because of either increasing insurance coverage or the availability
of subsidized care, demand becomes relatively more sensitive to
changes in time prices. Furthennore, this implies that the demand
for free medical services should be more responsive to changes in
time prices than demand for non-free services, because time is a
greater proportion of total price at free than at non-free providers.
Effects ofa Change in Income
Exogenouschanges in income can arise either from a change in
earnings per hour or from a change in non-earned income. The two
effects are not, in general, equal. The assumptions that are suffi-
cient to make money function as a price are also sufficient to mean
that an increase in non-earned income will produce an increase in
the demand for medical services. So the first prediction about
income is that there will be a positive non-earned income elasticity
of demand for normal goods.
The effects of a change in the wage rate cannot be determined a
priori because of offsetting influences. An increase in earnings per
hour produces an income effect, which acts to increase demand. It
also raises the opportunity cost of time, which reduces demand for
time-intensive activities. The net effect on the demand for medical
services depends on the time intensity of the price of medical
services relative to the time intensity of the price of all other goods
and services. We can break the effects of a change in the wage rate,
w, into an income effect and a substitution effect:
(3) = (T—mt Xs(q +ws) (p +wt) —Xt(q+ws)2
c9w
where ID
Iisa determinant of the matrix of coefficients from the
maximization equations. The first term is an income effect and is,
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DIby assumption, positive. The second term is the substitution of m Acton, 19
for X because of a change in w. We can establish that the substitu- ciation in
tion term is positive if and only if
(4) >wt
(q+ws)(p+wt)
3. THEDA thatis, if the time price is a larger proportion of the total price for
the composite good, X, than it is for medical services, m. The In this se
substitution effect is necessarily negative for free sources of medi- the defin
cal care since the condition in Equation (4) will not be met as long effect of
as there is a non-zero monetary price for X; that is, an increase in surveys
the wage rate will always cause a substitution effect away from the Center (1
free good. Of course, the net effect of a change in wages may still be The surv
• to increase the demand for medical services if the income effect baseline
• exceeds the substitution effect. Intuitively, however, the effect of a Charles
wage change on the demand for free medical services is primarily a hood He
price effect (and therefore is likely to be negative) and the effect of ducted o
a wage change on the demand for non-free sources is primarily an will refe
income effect (and therefore is likely to be positive), complete
almost 5,
completi
respectiv Predictionsfrom Other Formal Models
The simplified consumption model is adequate to generate empiri- An
cally verifiable hypotheses for the variables of primary interest in detail ab
this study. The Grossman (1972a, 1972b) investment model pro- Consequ
vides additional predictions regarding the effects of education and A weakn
age. Grossman enters health into the utility function and lets health by the ii
be produced by combining medical and other inputs. He argues cially m€
that if education raises health productivity (e.g., more highly usually i
educatedpersons are more skillful in combining medical inputs to the undi
produce health) and if the price elasticity of demand for health is ticities
lessthan 1, then when all other things are accounted for, he expects concentr
to find a negative relation between education and the amount of.
medical services demanded)°
The second implication of the Grossman formulation involves
r SelectedC investmentin neaitn over tne iiie cycle. II tne price elasticity ot
demand for health is less than 1, then the effect of age on the The Re
demand for medical care is positive if the depreciation rate on racial br
health rises with age and is negative if it falls with age. In general, white,"
we may suspect that the depreciation rate increases over the life (77 per
cycle, causing a positive effect of age on the consumption of years); a
medical care. However, the evidence presented below (and in $5,030 p
170 IActon 171)stitution of m
it the substitu-
Acton, 1973) suggests that in poor populations, substantial depre-
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3. THE DATA BASE
Inthis section I discuss the source of the data used for estimation,
the definition of the variables used for analysis, and the expected
effect of these variables. The data used came from two household
surveys conducted in 1968 by the National Opinion Research
Center (NORC) for the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO).
The surveys were conducted in Brooklyn, New York, to establish
baseline characteristics on the population before the Red Hook and
Charles Drew (in Bedford-Stuyvesant/Crown Heights) Neighbor-
hood Health centers were established. Both surveys were con-
ducted on straight probability samples of the target population. (I
will refer to them as Red Hook and Bedford-Crown.) In the
completed survey, approximately 1,500 households, containing
almost 5,000 individuals, had been interviewed in each study. The
completion rates were 82 and 81 per cent for the two samples,
respectively, and there is no evidence of bias in the incomplete
interviews." -
Anadvantage in using survey data is that it provides much more
detail about the variables of interest than the use of aggregate data.
Consequently, it allows more precise estimates of the relationships.
A weakness of survey data is that it relies chiefly on self-reporting
by the individual for some of the most important variables (espe-
cially medical utilization and income). Since the actual amounts are
usually under-reported, the coefficients may be biased. As long as
the under-reporting (or over-reporting) is proportional, the elas-
ticities will be unaffected.'2 Consequently, the empirical section
concentrates on the elasticities of the important variables.
ation involves
e elasticity of







Selected Characteristics of the Red Hook Population
TheRed Hook population contains about 25,000 persons. The
racial breakdown is 26 per cent Puerto Rican, 43 per cent "other
white," and 30 per cent black. It is a relatively stable neighborhood
(77 per cent had lived in the Red Hook area for more than five
years); average family size is 4.7 persons. The average income is
$5,030 per year. In twenty per cent of the households at least one
171
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memberwas receiving welfare, and 23 per cent fell below the OEO Definitionof
povertyline. The mean age is 27.3 years and the mean educational
level is 6.8 years in the full sample. This subs(
Approximately 33 per cent of the Red Hook population saw a empirical
physician in the outpatient department (OPD) of a municipal medical
hospital or a free-standing clinic during the year, and 48 per cent alphabetic
saw a physician in his private office. The average number of visits values. Th
for users of these physicians is 5.2 and 3.8 per year. In the and inpati
preceding year, over 9 per cent of the survey population was clinic is (
hospitalized at least once, and, on the average, hospitalized persons Days of h
spent 14.6 days in the hospital during the year. Almost 14 per cent or propne.
of the population reported having at least one chronic health sion here
condition limiting activity. There is a strong negative correlation income, s
between number of chronic conditions and family income, with the that may 1
under $3,000 individuals reporting five times as many chronic








The general characteristics of the Bedford-Crown survey are simi- zero
lar to the Red Hook population and can be summarized quickly. The qu
Bedford-Stuyvesant/Crown Heights is a predominantly black form. Afb
neighborhood. Blacks constitute 84 per cent of all residents, Puerto practition
Ricans, 7 per cent, and "other white," 9 per cent. The mean income usually ta
is $5,599. In Bedford-Crown, almost 20 per cent of the families fall times use
below the OEO poverty line and in 24 per cent at least one member Survey N
was receiving welfare. Average household size is 4.3 persons. NORC th
Females head 41 per cent of the Bedford-Crown households; only care, and
32 per cent of households were so headed in Red Hook. The mean waiting ti
age is 25.2 and educational level is 7.3 years in the full sample. necessar)
Although almost 15 per cent of respondents reported at least one with the
chronic health condition that limited activity, medical utilization complish
• appears generally lower in Bedford-Crown than in Red Hook. and two
Broken down by type of physician visit, 29 per cent saw a physician waiting t
at the OPD of a municipal hospital or a clinic (5.0 visits per year), TOPDC
and 40 per cent saw a physician in his private office (3.9 visits). The not, and
hospitalization rate was similar to what it was in Red Hook. Less time to a
than 8 per cent of the population was hospitalized for an average of a private




Celow the OEO Definitionof Variables Used and Expected Effect
aneducational This subsection discusses the nature of the variables used for the
pulation saw a empirical analysis and their expected effect on the demand for
a municipal medical services. For reference, Appendix 1 lists the variables in
48 per cent alphabetical order and provides a brief definition and the mean
umber of visits values. The four dependent variables cover the volume of ambulatory
r year. In the and inpatient care. The number of physician visits in an OPD or
opulation was clinic is OPDC and the number of private office visits is PRIV.
talized persons Days of hospitalization in public (municipal) and private (voluntary
ost 14 per cent or proprietary) hospitals are DAZPUB and DAZPRIV. The discus-
chronic health sion here will focus on explanatory variables by type—time price,
ive correlation income, sociodemographic, and so forth—and the interpretation
come, with the that may be given to them.
many chronic
Price Variables
Although the surveys conducted by NORC provide us with both
travel time and waiting time information, the respondents were not
queried about the money prices paid for medical services. I will
consider the bias the omitted money-price variables may cause in
the estimation after discussing the time variables, but the problem
is not severe since the appropriate monetary price for free care is
irvey are simi- zero anyway.
Lrized quickly. The questions about travel time and waiting time were similar in
inantly black form. After determining the usual source of medical care (general
;idents, Puerto practitioner, specialist, clinic, etc.) NORC asked: "How long does it
mean income usually take you to get there (the way you usually go)?" (The travel
families fall times used for this analysis are for a round trip.) In the Red Hook
st one member Survey NORC asked a similar question about usual waiting time.
s 4.3 persons. NORC then asked if there were a most trusted source of medical
useholds; only care, and if so, what it was (same options as usual source). Again, a
)ok. The mean waiting time question was posed in Red Hook. For analysis, it was
full sample. necessary to associate these times for usual and trusted sources
ed at least one with the dependent variables OPDC and PRIV. This was ac-
ical utilization complished by creating travel time variables, TOPDC and TPRIV,
in Red Hook. and two waiting time variables, ATOPDC and ATPRIV. The
aw a physician waiting time to usual source of care was used for creating the
is its per year), TOPDC variables if the usual source was an OPD or clinic; if it was
3.9 visits). The not, and the trusted source was an OPD or clinic, then the travel
Hook. Less time to a trusted source was used. Similarly, if the usual source was
r an average of a private practitioner, then that time information was used to create
TPRIV and ATPRIV. If the usual source was not a private prac-
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jtitioner, but the trusted source was, the trusted source information time price
was used. When trusted and usual providers were of the same type, bias the
the time information for the usual source was used. When the above (toward Z€
algorithmfailed to assign a value to one or more of the time bias down
variables (typically because usual and trusted sources of care were For a ni
both private and TOPDC and ATOPDC were therefore not availa- more resi
ble), the mean value for those who reported a time was used.'4 waiting ti
Depending on the particular application of the results, the chief varies wit
interest may be in the effect of the time variables themselves, or unobserv
there may be more interest in the effect of the time variables implicit n
multiplied by the opportunity cost of the unit of time. Each of the may be rn
four time-price variables is multiplied by the earned income per traveling.
minute for working persons to create four alternative time-price demand f
variables: CTOPDC, CATOPDC, CTPRIV, and CATPRIV. If the
person is not working or there is no earned income reported for the
family, 1 cent per minute is used as the value of time.'5 Income
The travel and waiting time data were reported in intervals. For Earned (}i
purposesof estimation, I used interval midpoints. The highest the surve
value (recorded as an open interval) was calculated by smoothing a reported i
cumulative distribution function through the interval midpoints per year.
and estimating an intercept. The mean value for travel time to the were $4,
sources of care generally requiring no out-of-pocket money expendi- showed
ture, TOPDC, was 72.9 minutes in Red Hook and 64.0minutesin demand
Bedford-Crown. The corresponding mean travel time for private medical s
physician visits, TPRIV, which generally required a money pay- for public
ment, was 44.6 minutes for Red Hook and 48.8 for Bedford-Crown. as inferio
The greater mean value for travel time to "free" sources of care elasticity
provides preliminary evidence to support the theoretical model respect to
developed above; people seem to be substituting time payments for earned in
money payments in their demand for care. The mean waiting times Relativ
from Red Hook are 59.1 minutes for ATOPDC and 73.7 minutes for sures in
ATPRIV. Although waiting time appears to be longer at private income
providers, the total time required to receive free care still exceeds procedur
that for non-free care. CTPRIV,
The expected effect of the time variables should be clear from the only to w
theoretical development. TOPDC and ATOPDC are the own-time
prices for OPDC and the cross-time prices for PRIV. They should
have a negative effect on utilization at OPDC and a positive effect Age
on PRIV. Similarly, TPRIV and ATPRIV are the own-time prices The age t
for PRIV and cross-time prices for OPDC and should act accord- in the dei
ingly. The absence of money-price information acts to bias the tion sugg
estimated effect of time prices associated with non-free sources of ciation ra
care. If there is a negative correlation between money prices and of variati
174 Acton 175 D
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timeprices, then the absence of money prices in the regression will
bias the coefficient on TPRIV upward. This will bias upward
(toward zero) the effect of own-time price in the PRIV equation and
bias downward the effect of cross-time prices in OPDC.
For a number of reasons, the demand for medical services may be
more responsive to changes in travel time than to changes in
waiting time. Travel frequently requires a monetary expense that
varies with distance or time; distant facilities require a higher (and
unobserved) financial payment. Waiting time does not entail this
implicit monetary charge. Furthermore, all other things equal, it
may be more pleasant to spend a given amount of time waiting than
traveling. Both effects lead us to expect a greater elasticity of
demand for travel time than for waiting time.
Income
Earned (EARN) and non-earned (NEARN) income were asked in
the survey instrument by household. The mean earned income
reported in Red Hook was $4,110 and non-earned income was $920
per year. The earned and non-earned incomes for Bedford-Crown
were $4,532 and $1,067, respectively. The theoretical model
showed an unambiguously positive non-earned income elasticity of
demand for medical services. The model was developed with
medical services as only one good. When there are four components
for public and private ambulatory and inpatient care, some may act
as inferior goods. In particular, there may be a negative income
elasticity of demand for OPDC and DAZPUB. The elasticity with
respect to earned income was indeterminate because an increase in
earned income also increased the opportunity cost of time.
Relatively few problems were encountered in the income mea-
sures in this data file. The figures for earned and non-earned
income apply to each member of the family. This differs from the
procedure used to create the variables CTOPDC, CATOPDC,
CTPRIV, and CATPRIV, wherein earned income was attributed
only to working members of the family. 16
Age
The age term is entered as AGE and AGE2 to allow for nonlinearity
in the demand for medical services. The Grossman (1972) formula-
tion suggested a positive correlation between age and the depre-
ciation rate on health. The nonlinear specification allows detection
of variations in the depreciation rate through the life cycle. In
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ts to bias the
ree sources of
ey prices andparticular, Acton (1973) suggested that the city's poor population
may be experiencing significant depreciation early in life.
Insurance
The insurance information is coded in categories that are not
mutually exclusive. For ambulatory care, I was forced to create a
variable, NOAMB, taking the value .1 if the person unambiguously
had no ambulatory coverage. In Red Hook, this meant he either had
no insurance at all or Medicare without the doctor coverage and
without private insurance. In Bedford-Crown, this meant only that
there was no coverage at all. For inpatient care, two dummy
variables, CAID and CARE, could be created to indicate if the
person had Medicaid or Medicare. Ideally, I would have liked to
have the specific deductible and coinsurance rates, of the person
faced at the margin, but this was totally beyond the available data.
NOAMB should have a positive sign in the equation for OPDC
and a negative sign in the PRIV equation, if their effects are
significant. If we assume that, all other things the same (such as
out-of-pocket payment), people would prefer to be in a non-
governmental hospital, then CAID and CARE should have a
negative sign in the equation for DAZPUB and a positive sign in
the DAZPRIV equation. Indeed, it is the popular impression in
New York City that the availability of Medicare and Medicaid
caused an exodus of patients from city municipal hospitals to the
private and voluntary hospitals.
Several measures of health status are available that seem to be
equally effective in explaining use.'7 I chose CHRON, the number
of chronic health conditions that limit activity, because it was
available in both surveys. Other variables that could have been
used in one data file or the other include number of days in bed last
year; number of days in bed or indoors last year; and self-perceived
health status (excellent, good, fair, poor). When I ran regressions
with these alternative measures, they all appeared with the antici-
pated sign and were highly significant (tratioson the coefficient in
excess of 4) and the remaining coefficients were quite stable.
CHRON is expected to appear with a positive sign in all equa-
tions. Persons with chronic conditions are more likely to suffer
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replacement more likely.'8 This is the gross effect of a decrement in
health status. It may be that sufficient decrements in health will
have a significant income effect, causing a shift to less expensive
forms of care. The chief influence of this income effect should be
captured in the income coefficients (which is one reason why they
will be entered nonlinearly). If a differential effect on health status
persists, it will probably be reflected in a greater coefficient in the
OPDC and DAZPUB equations than in the other two equations.
Hospitalization
Days of both public (DAZPUB) and private (DAZPRIV) hospital
care were entered in the ambulatory equations to measure decre-
ments in the health stock that occurred during the year. As such,
they should act like the health status measures; the more days of
hospitalization, the more likely the person is to consume ambula-
tory care.'9 This should produce positive coefficients on DAZPUB
and DAZPRIV in both the OPDC and PRIV equations. In general,
those who received public inpatient care should be more likely to
consume public than private ambulatory care. Those who received
private hospital care are more likely to consume private ambulatory
care, other things being equal. At least two factors could lead to a
positive coefflcient on DAZPRIV in the OPDC equation. First,
many people have insurance that covers inpatient care but not
outpatient care (Medicare without Part B is an example).2° These
people may seek inpatient care in private hospitals and ambulatory
care in public facilities. Second, there may be an income effect of a
long hospitalization in a private facility that causes the person to
shift to the public sector for his ambulatory care.
Education
The highest grade completed is coded in years (EDUC). If the
hypothesis is correct that more highly educated persons are more
efficient producers of health (along with appropriate price elas-
ticities), then there should be a negative coefficient in all four
equations. If, on the other hand, more highly educated persons
prefer private rather than public providers, then we should have a
negative coefficient in the OPDC and DAZPUB equations. The
coefficient in the PRIV and DAZPRIV equations would then be
biased toward zero because of the offsetting effects of the efficient
effect and the preference.
177
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Race isthatO
Two dummy variables, BLACK and PR (Puerto Rican), were with the
created. Since many of the factors expected to affect demand are indepen
already entered (particularly, income and health status), the coeffi- strained
cients on these two variables should reflect differences owing to variance
preferences for a particular type of provider or to discrimination never co




A dummy variable, MALE, was created, taking the value 1 if male Tobin (1
and zero otherwise. The expectation, based on the aggregate such dat
consumption by sex (and ignoring childbearing as the explanation), index ftc
is that males will be less intensive users of the system. This may, expected
however, reflect a higher opportunity cost of time that is not explanat
controlled, for in aggregate data; the current test should shed some lying 01
light on the partial effect of sex, given value of time. An interesting In the
additional hypothesis to test with this data base is that once they function
become ill, men will tend to remain under care longer (in a public not spec
system that does not require a significant monetary payment at the restrictio
margin) because they have let their health stock deteriorate more importai
than women have. Thus, we may find a positive coefficient on system c
MALE in DAZPUB. around
There
referenc Household Size For reas
The final variable is household size (HSIZE). All other things attentioi
being the same, larger households will have a lower income per are very
capita, reducing the demand for care at non-free sources. On the nitudes
other hand, taking a lifetime view of family decision making, the Section
number of children is an object of choice, making total family effect of
income the relevant variable and causing HSIZE to be relatively elasticiti
insignificant, variable
variable
4.ESTIMATION TECHNIQUES AND RESULTS The Time \
Beforediscussing the results of the estimation, let me comment on The effe
estimation techniques. Whenever a non-negligible proportion of travel a
the observations of the dependent variable takes on an extreme opportuf
value (either high or low), the assumptions underlying ordinary in natur
least squares (OLS) regression break down. Intuitively, the reason demand





























TT is that OLS requires equal variance in the error terms associated
with the dependent variable, regardless of the values of the
independent variables. When the dependent variableis con-
strained (say, it must be greater than or equal to zero), then the
variance is reduced near zero. Indeed, in this example, we can
never consider negative values.
Such is the case in the estimation here; we never consider
negative consumption of medical services. Furthermore, a large
proportion of the population reports a zero consumption of any one
particular type of service. This general problem was addressed by
Tobin (1958), who developed a maximum likelihood estimator for
such data (called the tobit estimator). The technique estimates an
index from which the probability of a non-zero purchase and the
expected value of that purchase can be determined, given the
explanatory variables. As the data approach the assumptions under-
lying OLS estimation, the tobit results approach OLS results.
In the theoretical model developed in Section 2, a general utility
function was used. For purposes of estimation, I have deliberately
not specified a particular utility function in order to put as few
restrictions as possible on the results. Instead, I have entered
important explanatory variables in linear and quadratic form. The
system can be viewed as the first two terms of a Taylor expansion
around whatever is the true model.
The results of the tobit estimation are given in tables 1 and 2. For
reference, the OLS estimation results are presented in Appendix 2.
For reasons just discussed, the tobit estimations receive all our
attention. In general, the coefficients presented in tables 1 and 2
are very significant.2' Furthermore, their signs and relative mag-
nitudes lend support to the theoretical implication derived in
Section 2. Since it is difficult to make a quick judgment of the net
effect of variables entered in quadratic form, table 3 gives the
elasticities of the expected value locus of the four dependent
variables with respect to all quadratically estimated explanatory
variables, calculated at the mean values.
TheTime Variables
Theeffects of time can be measured either from table 1, in which
travel and waiting times are multiplied by a measure of the
opportunity cost of time, or from table 2, in which time is entered
in natural units only. As shown in Appendix 3, the elasticity of
demand with respect to time equals the elasticity with respect to
j
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183 Ditime weighted by the opportunity cost of time. There are likely to
be biases in each set of coefficients such that the true elasticities
with respect to time prices are greater in absolute value than those
estimated. Consider first the specification with time weighted by
the opportunity cost of time (table 1). Since the opportunity cost of
time had to be imputed to nonworking persons and is not entirely
precise even for working persons, the wage rate is measured with
error. This error will bias the coefficients on the time variables in
table 1 toward zero. Thus, the true elasticities will be greater (in
absolute value) than those implied by the first specification. Con-
sider the alternative specification employing time in natural units
(table 2). In light of the model developed in Appendix 3, wt is
the correct variable, so that regressions employing taloneconsti-
tute an omitted variable bias. If w and tarenegatively correlated (as
seems reasonable), the coefficients estimated in Table 2 will also
be biased toward zero.22 In general, the elasticities implied by the
coefficients in table 2 exceed in absolute value those implied by
table1, suggesting that the bias resulting from the error in
measuring the opportunity cost of time is greater than the bias
caused by omitting it from the specification. I shall discuss both
specifications; almost all the remaining coefficients are quite stable
between tables 1 and 2. The chief exceptions are the income
coefficients—which are discussed in the next subsection—but even
so, their elasticities are reasonably stable. The other apparent
instabilities (PR and BLACK in the DAZPUB equations) reflect
coefficients that were not significantly different from zero in either
specification. Since both sets of estimated elasticities understate
the true elasticity, I will concentrate on the generally larger ones
implied by table 2.
Let us first concentrate on the travel time-price elasticities for
ambulatory care using time in natural units. The elasticities are
given in table 4. In this table we find support for many of the
hypotheses generated in Section 2. Travel time is indeed function-
ing as a normal price, producing negative own-time/price elas-
ticities and positive cross-time/price elasticities. Furthermore, the
magnitude of the own-time/price elasticities exceeds that of own-
money/price elasticities reported by other researchers. Using dis-
aggregated data from several sources, Phelps and Newhouse (1973)
derive money-price elasticities for private care on the order of
—0.15 in the range of 25 per cent to 0 per cent coinsurance—well
below (in absolute value) the —0.25 to —0.337 estimated here for
private care and —0.6 to —1.0 estimated for public care. Even using
the much higher elasticities for all ambulatory care of between —0.5
183
IDemand for Health Care among the Urban PoorTABLE 4 Travel Time-Price Elasticities for Ambulatory Care







OPDC — .958 .332 — .619 .137
PRIV .640 — .252 .629 — .337
and —1.0 reported by Rosett and Huang (1971), Feldstein (1971),
and Davis and Russell (1972), the travel-time elasticities appear to
be of at least a comparable size.
The hypotheses developed above also suggested that demand
should be more responsive to changes in TOPDC than to changes
in TPRIV—which is the case. In both Red Hook, and Bedford-
Crown, the own-travel time-price elasticities with respect to
TOPDC exceed those for TPRIV by a factor of two or three times.
Similarly, the cross elasticities for TOPDC are significantly greater
than those for TPRIV. The elasticities calculated for the C
variables support the conclusions drawn for the TIME variables
above. Found in table 3 are negative own-price elasticities, posi-
tive cross-price elasticities, and larger responses to CTOPDC and
CTPRIV. The one exception is Equation (6), in which there is a
negative cross-time/price elasticity of demand for PRIV with re-
spect to CTOPDC:
The effect of waiting time is similar to travel time as a deterrni-
nant of demand. But, as predicted, the elasticities with respect to
waiting time are smaller (in absolute value) than the elasticities
with respect to travel time. The own-waiting time-price elasticities
of demand for OPDC and PRIV are —0.120 for ATOPDC and
—0.050 for ATPRIV. The cross elasticities are 0.196 for ATPRIV
and —0.202 for ATOPDC. The last figure, giving a negative cross-
price elasticity of demand for PRIV with respect to ATOPDC, is the
only violation of the theoretical implications developed above.23
Otherwise, waiting time also functions as a normal price, with
demand being more responsive to changes in waiting time at
OPD's and clinics than it is to waiting times at private physicians'
offices.
We can draw some limited inferences about the effect of time
prices on the demand for inpatient care. We do not have a direct
measure of the time prices associated with hospitalization. The











































185 Dinterpreted primarily as cross prices to inpatient care—the more
time one must spend getting ambulatory care, the more likely one
should be to demand inpatient care. To a limited degree, we may
wish to consider TOPDC as a measure of travel time to public
hospitals—the DAZPUB variable—because all municipal OPD's
are located in a hospital. In Red Hook equations (3), (4), (11), and
(12), inpatient and outpatient care seem to be operating as substi-
tutes. The longer one must wait for ambulatory care, the more likely
one is to use inpatient care. The opposite appears to be. true in
Bedford-Crown. It is not clear why this difference exists at this
level of analysis, but it may be compatible with the hypothesis that
residents of Bedford-Crown are seeking care only for the more
serious health conditions, and in those cases, inpatient and outpa-
tient care are complements.24
Income
Thetheoretical model predicted that the elasticity of demand for all
forms of medical services with respect to non-earned income
should be positive unless public care is an inferior good, in which
case the elasticity is negative in OPDC and DAZPUB. The sign of
the elasticity with respect to earned income was indeterminate
because of offsetting effects of income and the time price, although
I suggested that it should be lower for free sources than for non-free
sources of care. Broadly speaking, the empirical results in table 3
support these hypotheses. With few exceptions, a positive elasticity
with respect to non-earned income was found in all equations. With
respect to earned income, a generally positive elasticity was found
for private care and a negative elasticity for public care. There is
little evidence to support the hypothesis that public care is an
inferior good (that is, that the elasticityof demand for OPDC and
DAZPUB with respect to NEARN is negative). Although the signs
of the income elasticities are reasonably stable between Red Hook
and Bedford-Crown, the size varies and the whole set of findings
must be regarded as provisional.
A word on alternative specification of the equations is in order.
Instead of using earned and non-earned income as explanatory
variables, I also estimated the entire set of equations using only
total income—entered as income and income squared.25 This alter-
native specification was used because I thought there might be a
high degree of collinearity between EARN and NEARN and the
waiting and travel time variables, especially when they were





































weighted by earned income. This alternative specification left the wealth attrib
remaining coefficients virtually unchanged (to the third decimal (wT) be the
place) and the significance of INC and INC2 was roughly the same all employe(
as either EARN and EARN2 or NEARN and NEARN2. The other wealth
point worth mentioning about alternative specifications is the effect care in Red
of the C TIME versus the TIME variables on the income elas- In
ticities. Although the EARN elasticities vary somewhat, the elas- specificatior
ticities with respect to NEARN are identical in the two specifica- (9k16).
tions.
In Red Hook, there is substantial support for the hypothesis that•
medical services are normal goods, producing an elasticity of A e
demandwith respect to non-earned income of about 0.04 or 0.05 for
ambulatory care and 0.16 for inpatient care.26 The elasticities with The human
respect'to earned income are positive for private sources of care and demand for
negative for public sources, supporting the suggestion that they price elasti
should be smaller for the free sources of care because a change in where in th
the wage rate has a greater price effect in demand for free care. In age coeffici
net, the price effect of a wage change dominates in the demand for (equations
public care and the income effect dominates in the demand for (11), (12), C
privatecare. years). Both
The Bedford-Crown results produce elasticities somewhat less in tial decrem
conformity with the predictions of the model and there are two sign only curve
reversals of corresponding elasticities between the C TIME and physician c
TIME specifications. I will discuss only aberrations from the cients are
picture just described for Red Hook. In equations (6) and (14), there
is a negative non-earned income elasticity of demand for private
physician care that appears robust, suggesting that public care is a Insurance
normalgood and private ambulatory care is an inferior good. When
I discuss the effects of race on demand for care, there is some The
suggestion of discrimination, and part of the effect may appear here. care. In all
The two sign reversals occur for earned income in equations (5) and the coeffici
(13) and for non-earned income in equations (7) and (15). The latter and (15)) a
may be explained by the critical point lying near the mean of the general. TI
data, but the former is not so easily accounted for. Medicare
Otherwise, the general pattern of effects of income on demand for private
care that was reported in Red Hook holds in Bedford-Crown. The lowers der
oniy support in either set of regressions for the hypothesis that duced sign
public care is an inferior good is in Equation (15), in which the The pictur
non-earned income elasticity of demand for DAZPUB is _0.019.27 certain,
From the estimated elasticities with respect to non-earned in- explanator
come we can calculate the approximate magnitude of the full results (at
wealth elasticity. The full wealth elasticity equals the non-earned with ai
income elasticity multiplied by the increase of the share of full physicians
186
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wealth attributable to non-earned income.28 Let full earned income
(wT) be the earning of a person employed full time and assume that
all employed persons are working full time.29 Then the implied full
wealth elasticity of demand is 0.202 for OPDC and 0.251 for private
care in Red Hook.3°
In discussing the remaining effects, I will concentrate on the
specification with the time variables in natural units, equations
(9)—(16).
The human capital formulation predicts a positive correlation of the
demand for care and rate of depreciation on the health stock (if the
price elasticity of demand for health is less than 1). We can infer
where in the life cycle depreciation is greatest by examining the
age coefficients. The age curve is either monotonically decreasing
(equations (9) and (13)) or is an inverted U shape (equations (10),
(11), (12), (15), and (16) all peak between thirty-two and thirty-six
years). Both patterns support the conclusion that there are substan-
tial decrements in health early in life for these populations. The
only curve that is monotonically rising is the demand for private
physician care in Bedford-Crown (equation (14)), and its coeffi-
cients are not significantly different from zero.
Insurance
The greatest effect of insurance is seen in the demand for hospital
care. In all cases, the estimated coefficients are positive, although
the coefficients in the DAZPUB equations (equations (3), (7), (11),
and (15)) are not statistically significantly different from zero in
general. The significant effects support the popular image that
Medicare and Medicaid caused an increase in the demand for
private hospitalization. We cannot conclude, however, that this
lowers demand for public hospital care (which should have pro-
duced significant negative coefficients in the DAZPUB equations).
The picture with respect to insurance for ambulatory care is less
certain, no doubt because of the imprecise definition of the
explanatory variable NOAMB. The only statistically significant
results (at 5 per cent or lower, equations (2) and (10)) showpeople
with no ambulatory insurance demanding less care from private
physicians.
187
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Hospitalization
Byand large, people who reported being hospitalized were likely
to be users of ambulatory facilities. As suggested, people who
reported public hospitalization were more likely to use public
ambulatory care than private ambulatory care (the coefficients for
DAZPUB in the PRIV equations (2), (6), (10), and (14) were either
negative or not significantly different from zero). Those who
reported private hospitalization were significantly more likely to
use both public and private ambulatory care.
HealthStatus
Thehealth status variables are the most consistently significant
predictors of demand for care. Greater numbers of chronic health
conditions produce higher utilization of all forms of medical ser-
vices (with tratiosranging from 4 to over 16). We suggested that
poorer health stock might produce an income effect, causing greater
demand for free than for non-free care from those with chronic
conditions. The evidence is consistent with this hypothesis.3'
Education
Itwas postulated that if educated persons were more efficient
producers of health and the price elasticity of health is less than 1,
then the coefficient on education would be negative. On the other
hand, those with higher education might have developed a taste for
more health services, particularly non-free services. The two effects
together should yield a negative coefficient on EDUC in the OPDC
and DAZPUB equations and coefficients biased upward in PRIV
and DAZPRIV. This pattern is found in the estimated demand for
ambulatory care. There is a significant negative coefficient on
education in the demand for OPDC and clinic services. The mixed
effect of efficiency and taste is shown by coefficients biased upward
in equations (2), (6), (10), and (14). In the demand for inpatient care,
education has.a positive effect in all but one case, when its tvalueis
0.84.
Generally, the coefficients on the race variables are very significant
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Sex
relations are compatible with an interpretation that blacks and
Puerto Ricans either have an aversion to private care or that they
face discrimination in private ambulatory care. There are signifi-
cant negative coefficients on both BLACK and PR in the PRIV
equations and significant positive coefficients in OPDC. There is a
definite substitution of public for private care, all other things held
constant. The coefficients in the hospital equations are less sig-
nificant, but when their tvalueexceeds 1.96 they support the
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Gross consumption figures lead us to expect a negative coefficient
on the dummy variable for MALE in all demand equations. The
possible exception would be a positive (or at least greater) coeffi-
cient in the DAZPUB equation if men had let their health stock
deteriorate more and thus, once hospitalized, would be confined
longer. These two expectations are supported in all the estimated
relations, although the positive coefficient in the DAZPUB equa-
tions is not significantly different from zero.
HouseholdSize
Finally,all other things held the same, HSIZE should produce a
negative coefficient in paid sources of care. For reasons that are not
entirely clear, there is also frequently a negative coefficient on
HSIZE in the public sources of care. It may be that the larger family
size is increasing the opportunity cost of everyone's time (espe-
cially that of the parents) and thus reducing all use of services.
5. CONCLUSION AND SELECTED POLICY
IMPLICATIONS
Conclusion
The objective of this study was to measure the major factors
influencing demand for medical services. In particular, we were
looking for a mechanism that might replace money prices in
189 Demand for Health Care among the Urban Poorr
determining demand as money price out of pocket diminished.
I becauseof
There was considerable theoretical and empirical support for the enactment c
suggestion that time prices would fill that role. Travel and waiting lower oppo
time appear to be operating as normal prices, producing a negative reduction o
own-price elasticity and a positive cross-price elasticity of demand opportunity
for medical services. As predicted, elasticities were greater with Conclusion
respect to times associated with free care than with times associated costs and
with non-free care. The magnitude of the own-elasticity with there is uk
respect to travel time is —0.6 to —1.0 for public outpatient care and increases ti
between —0.25 and —0.34 for private outpatient care. These elas- waiting tin
ticities are significantly greater than the money-price elasticities of referrals).32
about —0.15 over the range 0 to 25 per cent coinsurance reported by those with I
Phelps and Newhouse (1972) for a Palo Alto group and equal or the vector o
exceed the higher values reported by Feldstein (1971), Davis and would be
Russell(1972), and Rosett and Huang (1973). The estimated elas- of a reduci
ticities with respect to travel time weighted by earnings are in the
. distributior
order of —0.15 to —0.2 for OPDC care and nearly zero for private Among t
care,but, as discussed, these estimates are biased significantly wishes to i:
toward zero. Furthermore, as predicted, demand is more sensitive travel time
to changes in travel time than to changes in waiting time, producing
elasticities several times as large for travel as for waiting time. The tuted for su
conclusion is clear that time is already functioning as a rationing
device for demand in this New York population, and its importance
seems to exceed that of money prièes. Clinic Location
From the theoretical model, we derived a prediction of positive
elasticity of demand with respect to non-earned income. A picture A significa
of mixed statistical significance was found, but when significant, outpatient
elasticities were around 0.04 to 0.05 for ambulatory care and 0.15 to time. A flu]
0.20 for inpatient care. The sign of the earned income elasticity of for
apriori because of the offsetting facilities to
income and price effects of a wage change, but a change in the wage travel time
rate was expected to act more like income effect on the demand for will increa
non-free care. In fact, negative elasticities were found for free care when the c
and positive elasticities for non-free care, roughly of the same new clinic





A number of policy considerations are suggested by the significant clinics or ti
elasticities found for time prices and earned and non-earned number of
income. The most important involves the distribution of medical sizes, the b
services, as out-of-pocket monetary expenses are reduced, either means of
190 Acton .
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because of continued spread of health insurance or because of the
enactment of some federal health insurance scheme. Persons with a
lower opportunity cost of time will take more advantage of a
reduction of out-of-pocket monetary costs than those with higher
opportunity cost of time because their time prices are lower. This
conclusion holds even with no differential subsidy of monetary
costs and no supply response to an increase in demand. Moreover,
there is likely to be a supply response to a shift in demand that
increases the time needed to receive medical services (increased
waiting time or perhaps increased travel time owing to more
referrals).32 This will increase further the relative shift in favor of
those with lower opportunity cost of time (although the increase in
the vector of time prices will reduce aggregate demand over what it
would be with no supply response). In any case, the generhi effect
of a reduction in personal monetary prices will be to shift the
distribution of medical services.
Among the important additional policy considerations, if one
wishes to increase aggregate demand for services, are shortening
travel time to medical facilities, shortening waiting time, and
considering the degree to which income subsidies might be substi-
tuted for subsidized purchase of medical services.
Clinic Location
A significant own-time/price elasticity of demand was found for
outpatient department and clinic services with respect to travel
time. A number of policy options are available to the government
for altering travel time, ranging from improved transportation
facilities to the building of new clinics and health centers. The
travel time elasticities show that moving centers "closer" in time
will increase the demand for care at those centers. For instance,
when the city, OEO, or another agency is thinking about opening a
new clinic to serve a target population, it may want to consider
building a number of smaller clinics that are substantially closer, on
the average, to the individuals, rather than building one large clinic
to serve the population.33 Faster means of transportation to more
distant facilities may achieve the same goal. This observation
should not be interpreted as a recommendation to create more
clinics or to create smaller clinics. Obviously the decision rests on a
number of factors, such as the cost of building centers of various
sizes, the benefit of serving additional persons, and the alternative
means of achieving the same goals. One alternative means of
I
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achieving the goal of increased service is to reduce waiting time in health inst existing and new facilities,
health insu
similar inc
Shorter Queues tradeoff wit
3 indicate t Thereare two points to consider about waiting time and the with a cui demand for care. First, it is a popular impression that patients have income of to wait considerably longer in outpatient departments of hospitals demand foi than in private physicians' offices. The reported waiting times for probably a 1968 show that, for this population, mean waiting time was less at income ela OPD's and clinics than in private physicians' offices. The second nent. If ti point, however, is that longer waiting times do discourage use, and medical se mechanisms that reduce waiting time should increase use. For tion,36 and instance, appointments rather than unscheduled visits in OPD's cent of mc might prove successful in reducing waiting time. This implication coinsuranc is not limited to the city. Many hospitals across the nation use a 5,000), thei system of giving all the patients a morning appointment (say 9:00) Clearly, or or an afternoon appointment (say 1:30). If this algorithm results in a gate medic wait, on the average, of ninety minutes and an alternative schedul- and the ing (say appointments on the hour for 9, 10, or 11) reduces the range of si average wait to thirty minutes, the elasticities reported in table 3
suggest that this will increase demand approximately 12 per cent.34
Tradeoffs of Subsidized Care and Income Supplements APPENDIX
Many people have expressed concern over the level of medical
services consumed by the poor and conclude that a variety of
measures are needed to improve access. In one form or another, DefinitionsC
most boil down to a subsidized provision of services, whether AGE through social insurance schemes such as Medicaid or various
national health insurance proposals, or through direct provision of AGE2
care as in neighborhood health centers or the requirement that ATOPDC
Hill-Burton hospitals provide charity care. Seldom considered is
the extent to which changing the income distribution will meet the
desire to subsidize the medical purchase (Davis, 1972).
ATOPDC2 The equations reported in tables 1 and 2 put us in a position to
address this question of substituting income maintenance for sub- ATPRIV
sidized medical care to achieve a given increase in health consump-
tion. Although it will not meet the objective of risk spreading,
income maintenance will increase aggregate medical care demand ATPRIV2
for the poor. Since income maintenance is a non-earned source of
BLACK income, the elasticity of demand for medical care with respect to
changes in non-earned income is used.33 Two of the prominent
192
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193health insurance proposals,, the administration's comprehensive
health insurance proposal (CHIP) and the Kennedy-Mills bill, have
similar income-related coinsurance features and demonstrate the
tradeoff with income maintenance. The Red Hook results in table
3 indicate that a $1,000 increase in non-earned income for a family
with a current (1968) non-earned income of $450 and earned
income of about $4,100 will produce a 6.3 per cent increase in the
• demand for private practitioners' care per member. This change is
probably a lower bound on the increase, since the non-earned
income elasticity may be biased downward by a transitory compo-
nent.If the money-price elasticity of demand for ambulatory
medical services is around —0.15 over the range under considera-
tion,36 and the out-of-pocket expenditure is reduced from 25 per
cent of money price to 15 per cent (the upper limit on CHIP's
coinsurance rate and the rate for a family with income of $2,500—
5,000), then the demand for private care will increase by 8 per cent.
Clearly, one means of achieving the objective of increased aggre-
gate medical consumption by the poor is income supplementation,
and the magnitude of the change may be very comparable over the
range of subsidy and income guarantee under consideration.
Definitionsof Variables Used and Their Mean Values37
AGE =Agein years. Means =(27.3, 25.2).
AGE2 =AGE2.Means =(1,200,1,006).
ATOPDC=Waitingtime, on the average, at municipal outpatient de-
partments (MDOPD) or free-standing clinics (CLIN), in
minutes. Available for Red Hook only. Mean =(59.1).
ATOPDC2 =ATOPDC2.Mean =(3,717).
ATPRIV =Waitingtime, on the average, in a private physician's of-
fice, in minutes. Available for Red Hook only. Mean =
(73.7).
ATPRIV2=ATPRIV2.Mean =(6,530).
BLACK =Dummyvariable equaling 1 if Negro or indeterminate, or
• other than Puerto Rican, Mexican-American, American
Indian, or other white. Means =(0.30,0.84).
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4CAID =Oneif the person has Medicaid coverage and is under 65 NOAMB
years of age; zero otherwise. Means =(0.32,0.36).
CARE =Oneif person has Medicare coverage; zero otherwise.
Means =(0.07,0.04). OPDC
C TIME =Forall time variables prefixed by C it is the corresponding
variable without the prefix C multiplied by the oppor-
tunity cost of time. The opportunity cost of time is PR
measured by the earnings per minute of family workers PRIV if the individual is working and is set to 1 cent per min-
ute if the individual is not working or if there is no re-
ported earned income for the family. TOPDC
CATOPDCMean =($1.17).
CATOPDC2Mean =(3.61). TOPDC2
CATPRIV Mean =($1.39). TPRIV
CATPRIVZ Mean =(5.32).
CTOPDC Means =($1.42,$1.57). TPRIV2
CTOPDC2 Means =( 5.46,6.66).
CTPRIV Means =($0.88,$1.24).
CTPRIV2 Means =(2.98,6.76).
CHRON Number of reported chronic health conditions that limit
activity. Means =(0.20,0.21).
DAZPRIV=Numberof days hospitalized in last year in a nongovern-
mental hospital. Means =(1.07,0.69).
DAZPUB=Numberof days hospitalized in last year in a city or other
governmental hospital. Mean =(0.30,0.50).
EARN =Earnedfamily income in last year. Means =($4,110,
$4,532).
EARN2 = Means =(35388091,45129544).
EDUC =Highestgrade completed, in years. Means =(6.8,7.3).
HSIZE =Numberof persons in individual's household. Means =
(4.7,4.3).
MALE =Oneif male, zero if female. Means(0.46, 0.44).




IActon 195 Der= Oneif the person unambiguously has no insurance cov-
erage for ambulatory care; zero otherwise. Means =(0.21,
0.23).
=Numberof visits in last year to a physician in outpatient
department of a municipal hospital or to a clinic not con-
nected to a hospital. Means =(1.68,1.46).
=Oneif Puerto Rican; zero otherwise. Means =(0.26,0.07).
=Numberof visits in last year to a physician in his private
office. Means =(1.83,1.56).
=Traveltime, on the average, to and from municipal out-
patient department or free-standing clinic, in minutes.
Means =(72.9,64.0).
=TOPDC2.Means =(6,085,4,424).
=Traveltime, on the average, to and from private physi-
cian's office (PRIV), in minutes. Means =(44.6,48.8).
= Means =(3,096,3,521).
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Detail of the Formal Model of Demand for Medical
Services (A4b)
The formal model is developed in terms of a two-good utility and
function, medical services, m, and a composite good, X, and has
people pay in both money and time for each good. If the proportion (A-4c)€o +wt)-
ofmoney and the price per unit of the good remains fixed and the
full wealth assumption is used, the objective is to maximize If we desigi
(A-la) U = U(m,X) then
subject to
Dl
(A-lb)(p +wt)nz +(q +ws)X =.y +wT
wherethe variables are defined as on p. 167. 1 assume that all
equations are twice differentiable and that the first derivatives of (A4d)
the utility function are positive, the second derivatives, negative, =u
and the cross derivatives are positive.38 The conditions for maximiz-
ing utility are found by forming the Lagrangian expression —
(A-2)L=U(m ,X) + X [m(p +wt)+X(q+ws)—y—wT] Assuming ti
is unambig Differentiating with respect to the three unknowns, m, X, and







(A-3c) +wt) +X(q +ws) —y —wT0
Since A is
unambiguot where by definition good; with
—OCT A — Similarly,
U,,,=-i---— anu
= ofm on the
Effects of a Change in Pnce (A-5a) Umm
To calculate the effect of a change in the out-of-pocket money price
of in on the demand for ni, we must differentiate the system of
equations (A-3) with respect to p, yielding: (A5b) Uxm
198 .Acton 199 DemOm OX OK
(A-4a)Umm + Um¼' + (p + = K
op op op
dical OX OX
(A-4b)Uvm + + (q + ws) =0
äp Op Op
wo-good utility and
od, X, and has OX
f the proportion (A.4c)(p + wt) + (q + ws) =— m
s fixed and the
maximize If we designate the determinant of the matrix of coefficients D,
then
Umm Umx (p +wt) I
ID (q + ws)I
(p+wt)(q+ws) 0
assume that all
t derivatives of (AAd)
lives, negative, =Umx(q + ws)(p+wt) + (q + ws)(p + wt)
ns for maximiz-
— (p + wt)2 —Umm(q + ws)2 pressiOn
Assuming that and Umm <0 and that and Umx >0, then ID
I




—m (q +ws) 0
o (q +ws)
DI
— +ws) (p +wt) + X(q +ws)2
Since A is necessarily negative by (A-3a) and (A-3b), Om/Op is
unambiguously negative. Medical services, m, is acting as a normal
good; with a higher money price, people demand less.
Similarly, we can calculate the effect of a change in the time price
of m on the demand form. Differentiating with respect tot yields
Om OX OX
(A-5a)Umm +UmX + (p + wt)— =— KID
:et money price
the system of OX OX—
(A-5b) + +(q +ws) —0
at at at
199
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and The three
ölfl
(A-5c)(p +wt) + (q+ws) = —mw (A-7a)71mun =
Using Cramer's rule again, and




(A-5d) = & DI
as
——mw +ws) +wt) +Aw(q+ws)2
— IDI p<Wt
whichis also unambiguously negative. That is, time is also func-
tioning as a price in determining the consumption of m. Effects of a
For reference, it is interesting to calculate the total price elastic- The effects
ity of demand form. Differentiating equations (A-3) with respect to systernatica
(p + wt), we find effect of a
calculate. t
t9m oX +U (A-6a)UmmO(p +wy)
mX
O(p+wt)





OX ox +U (A6b)U.vmO(p + wt)
X
O(p+ wt)















—X Umx (p +wt) I
0 (q +ws) I
Om = —m(q + ws) 0 I
O(p+wt) IDI (A-8d) =




Om = which is un
is normal; +wt) Op
201 IDec
200 ActonThe three price elasticities are related in the following manner:
tot
(A-7a) = Tlmt = +ri)
(A-7b) Tlmp
(p +wt)




ime is also func-
n of m.
otal price elastic-




Effects of a Change in Income
The effects of a change in earned and non-earned income are
systematically related, but they are not, in general, the same. The
effect of a change in non-earned income is straighiforward to
calculate. Differentiating equations (A-3) with respect to y yields:
OX OX
(A-8a)U,,,,, + +(p+ tot)—= 0
Oy Otj c3y











which is unambiguously positive. The demand for medical services
is normal; with more non-earned income, people demand more.







= (q+ ws) — U.vx (p+ wt)
DIWe can see the effect of a change in the earnings per hour by NOTES
differentiatingwith respect to w:
1.See Ne tim OX OX
(A-9a)Umm + + (p +wt)— =— xt 2Seeesp
Ow Ow Ow and
3.If denr
tim OX OX (A9b)Uvm + + (q + ws)— =— As increase




(A-9c)(p + wt) + (q + ws) =— mt—Xs+ T time, TI
Ow (1965);
Holtmai
Cramer's rule yields: correcti:
include
—At (p +wt) I timeini
informai
—As (q + ws) If such
(A-9d)









The effects of a change in the wage rate can be broken down into an 4.Similar
income effect and substitution effect:
(1973).
5.See Gro
tim Am As (q + ws) (p + wt) —At(q+ ws)2 I 6.See Ph
(A-9e) =(T—mt —Xs) — endoger
Ow DI
I 7.See Lai
attribute The first term, the income effect, is by assumption positive. The 8.Althoug
sign of the substitution effect depends on the relative time intensity that the
/ofthe goods m and X. If the time component of total price is larger positive,
for X than it is for m, there will be a positive substitution from xto derivatii
m. That is, the substitution term is positive if and only if 9.As show
the long
utilizati( ws wt
(A-lOa) > 10.lnthec (q +ws) (p +wt)
It is easy to show that the substitution effect is negative if medical negative
care is "free." Substituting p = 0 into (A-lOa), canceling common 11, NORC c
terms, and multiplying through by (q + ws) yields was the
improve
(A-lob) ws <(q +ws) Hook sa
Bedford-
Therefore, the substitution effect is negative. is availa
202 Acton 203 Der
A1.See Newhouse and Acton (1974) for a discussion of this point.
2.See especially Davis and Russell(1972), Feldstein (1971), Phelps (1973), Phelps
and Newhouse (1973), and Rosett and Huang (1973).
3.If demand increases in response to spreading insurance, in addition to
increases in waiting and travel time, the supply responses may be to (1)
increase the number of referrals to other providers, (2) cause a postponement in
treating some conditions, or (3) change the quality of services being provided.
Increased referrals and postponement are alternative forms of greater time
costs. In this study, I am concentrating directly on the role of waiting and travel
time. The importance of time in determining demand was explored by Becker
(1965); its importance in medical care, by, among others, Leveson (1970),
Holtman (1972), and Auster and Ro (1972). In her comments, Mrs. Campbell
correctly points out that "waiting time" in this survey probably does not
include the amount of time spent in an examination room unattended or the
time in transit between different tests or parts of the facility. This more detailed
information would be interesting to explore but was unavailable in this survey.
If such additional "hidden" time charges are independent of or proportional to
time in the waiting room, the elasticities are unaffected; if they are negatively
correlated, then the empirical results are misleading. She also comments that
increased referrals or postponement of appointments may be an important
supply response to spreading coverage—with which I agree. I do not agree that
its absence in these equations limits their value for policy assessment. Unless
one can demonstrate that suppliers will discriminate systematically in their
patterns of postponement and referrals, then the waiting time and travel time
results reported below are partial effects that should be observed regardless of
these other effects.
4.Similar models can be found in Grossman (1970), Becker (1965), and Acton
(1973).
5.See Grossman (1972) for a formulation accommodating this feature.
6.See Phelps (1973) for a theoretical and empirical treatment with insurance
endogenou s.
7.See Lancaster (1966) for a similar formulation of demand in terms of the
attributes of a good.
8.Although they are more restrictive than necessary, sufficient assumptions are
that the first derivatives of the utility function with respect to a good are
positive, that the second derivatives are negative, and that the cross-partial
derivatives are positive.
9.As shown in Appendix 3, 7?mufl= 7imt Theseelasticities are approximate only in
the long run if insurance premiums are adjusted to reflect the changes in
utilization.
10.In the consumption model, given a neutral effect of education on all household
activities, the elasticity with respect to wealth must also be less than ito have a
negative effect on education; Grossman (1972a, pp. 36—37).
11. NORC conducted ten baseline surveys for OEO. The Bedford-Crown survey
was the second survey and Red Hook the third. The survey instrument
improved somewhat, so occasionally we have useful information on the Red
Hook sample that is not available for Bedford-Crown. A description of the
Bedford-Crown study, along with the survey instrument and selected findings,
is available in Richardson (1969a). A similar report on the Red Hook study is
203
IDemand for Health Care among the Urban Poor
NOTES ngs per hour by
s)(p +wt)+At(q+ws)2




tal price is larger
:itution from X to
only if
gative if medical
nceling commonRichardson (1969b).Selectedfindings for the first three NORC studies (Atlanta
and the two Brooklyn surveys) are presented in Richardson (1970).
12.Let k proportion of the variable x be reported, then the estimated (price)
elasticity = =(ôx/âp) the same elasticity that would
have been estimated with correct reporting.
13.Conversations with OEO officials have indicated that the acceptance of the
neighborhood health centers has been different from the two populations. The
Red Hook population is changing its behavior by coming to the center for early
care and preventive medicine. In Bedford-Crown, the population comes in
chiefly for treatment of advanced and chronic conditions. There may be some
persistent differences in the two populations that will be reflected in the
analysis below. It could simply be a different acceptance of the neighborhood
health centers. The Bedford-Crown center is located in a very rough neighbor-
hood and, purportedly, taxi drivers refuse to travel there. This does not appear
to be true for the Red Hook neighborhood.
14.The use of a mean value rather than zero for these nonresponses was necessary
to avoid the implausible situation that higher own-time prices are associated
with lower utilization except for zero utilization when own-time prices are
zero. A predicted value of own-time price might have been used, but that
option is deferred for further analysis. It was necessary to use the mean value
for about three-fourths of the times associated with free care and about
one-fourth of the times associated with non-free care in both samples.
Using the mean to replace missing values reduced the efficiency in estimat-
ing that coefficient, but Charles Phelps demonstrated that use of the mean for
some observations does not bias the remaining coefficients if the mean is
uncorrelated with the remaining variables. Consider the bivariate case in
which m observations on; are known and the next p are replaced with the
mean (their true value is +u,).The OLS estimator of/I is b = +
+ Ep(x +u)2] = {Lj(xxfI) +xe} + +u)(x/3+
+ + u)2]. The measurementerror for the subset, p, of
observation is= —x1)so that = and += 0,where the sub-
scripts on variances indicate the subsample to which they relate. The probabil-
ity limit of b can be shown to be plim b + + + +
Since,in subsample of size p, 4 + + =0and = it follows
that =oI,,and plim b =(4m +0)13/((4m + 0) =/3.
15.It is necessary to use a non-zero value for the opportunity cost of a unit of time if
travel and waiting time are to play a role in determining demand for a specific
provider by nonworking persons. Otherwise, we are assuming that, in effect,
the person is indifferent whether he travels a short distance for care or travels a
great distance. Furthermore, physician visits by children frequently cause an
adult to spend time accompanying them. The value of 60 cents per hour for this
group is arbitrary, but it can be motivated to some degree as a plausible value
for the cost of hiring a babysitter. The value of 60 cents is lower than any
observed value of eai-nings per hour in either sample (which was over $1 per
hour). A number of researchers have taken a much more detailed look at
valuing the time of persons out of the labor force (see, for instance, Gronau,
1973a and b, and references cited). I did not feel a more complicated approach
was justified in the current application because of limited information about
time allocation of individual family members.
16.I took the total reported income and subtracted the elements that were
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w cases, the sum of
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non-earned incomes exceeded the stated total income (typically, zero was
recorded for total, but a monthly social security income was reported). In these
cases, the amount created by summing up the components was used.
17.Ideally, health status lagged one period would be used. It was not available,
but its absence is not too serious since the underlying stock of health is highly
correlated from one year to the next.
18.In addition, people with more chronic health conditions probably have a lower
stock of health to begin with, so that it takes more medical inputs to achieve a
given replacement of health than it would if they had started with a greater
stock. This argument assumes that the function transforming medical inputs to
health has decreasing returns to scale.
19.To some degree, inpatient and outpatient care may be substitutes for each
other, but I expect their complementary nature to dominate. I checked the
sensitivity of the remaining coefficients to the inclusion and exclusion of these
hospital variables and found the coefficients practically unchanged.
20.If everyone's insurance coverage were known in detail, this would not be a
problem; but NOAMB is an imperfect measure, as indicated above.
21.The tstatisticsare asymptotic tests in the tobit framework. With samples of 5,000,
they probably are good guides to significance. Furthermore, the chi2 statistics
test the hypothesis that the vector of coefficients is zero; they, too, are highly
significant.
The reader should not attach too much importance to the equations for public
hospitalization since the number of non-zero observations is very small.
22.Figure 1A shows the quantity of care demanded as a function of either torwt.
People who appear to have high time inputs to the purchase of care (indicated
on the line marked t) tend to have proportionately lower values of wt because
of the negative correlation of wandt.Conversely,those who appear to have
low time inputs tend to have higher opportunity costs of time and therefore
proportionately higher values of wt. The sanie result holds for the cross-time
prices indicated in Fig. lB. Thus, the true elasticity with respect to wt will be
greater than that implied by the regression on talone.
FIGURE1a FIGURE 1 b
Relation between Relation between
own-time prices cross-time prices
and quantity and quantity
q q
t, wt t, wtI.
23.This apparent contradiction may be because the estimated maximum occurs
1 they do n
where ATOPDC =45minutes. The mean, used for calculating the elasticity, is monetary
59 minutes, which is one standard deviation above the critical point, physician
24.Using a 1965 survey of users of the municipal hospitals' OPDs (specifying a (1970), F
simultaneous equation system with public and private ambulatory care and discussioi
public hospitalization all endogenous), I found complementarity in public attempt t
ambulatory and inpatient care. See Acton (1973).
I opportuni
25.This comparison was carried out using OLS—whose results approach tobit
asymptotically—because patterns of significance and collinearity were found to 33.One form
carry over well to tobit results. centrally
26.These estimated elasticities may be biased downward by a transitory compo- 34.This is ar
nent in non-earned income. The negative elasticity for private hospital days, 35.This calci
equations (4) and (12), is caused by the elasticity's being calculated at the mean nal tax ra
of the data ($920), which was just to the left of the minimum of our estimated 36.The actw
relationship ($939 in Equation (4) and $1,183 in Equation (12), which is within and Phel1
one-seventh of a standard deviation of the mean). For approximately half the reports.
sample, the non-earned income elasticity has the expected positive sign. For 37.The mea
most other equations, the critical point is not within one standard deviation of Crown.
the mean of the data. 38.These ass
27.Michael Grossman pointed out that, in general, we can expect to find lower rise in th
elasticities with respect to earned income in equations (9)—(16) than in
equations (1)—(8). Consider the simplified form of a demand equation,
(4a) m =a +bp+cY
where p =wtand Y =y+ wT. We expect b <0 and c >0. Substituting into
(4a) yields
I REFERENCE
(4b) m=a +cwT +cy
1.Acton,Ja
similar to equations (1)—(8). With wt held constant, the coefficient, c, on full Mo
earnings should be positive. When we estimate 2.Auster, 1
(4c)m=a-l-b't+c'wT+dy Ho
Ec
the coefficient c' could be negative. The elasticities reported intable 3 3.Becker,
generally support this prediction that the earning elasticities in equations I (Se
(9)—(16) are lower than those in equations (1k8). —— 4.Davis, K
28.Since (&m/ÔY) = itfollows that = (Om/ÔY)(Y/m) =(&m/ôy) Na
(YIm) .(YIy) = (Yly). Ins
29.If the reader wishes to make other assumptions about the definition of full 5.
wealth, then the elasticities can be adjusted accordingly. For instance, if T is Ca
taken as referring to a twenty-four-hour day instead of a forty-hour work 6.Feldsteii
week, the full wealth elasticities reported here should be scaled up by 4.2. Qu
30.The corresponding elasticities for the Bedford-Crown sample, 1.317 and 7.Frech, I
—0.7 14, reflect the estimated coefficients on N EARN, and the comments made Co
above apply. . 57
31.It is probably not worth conducting a rigorous test of this hypothesis, which 8.Gronau,
requires calculation of the covariance among equations, but it seems valid. H
32.This supply response is likely for a number of reasons. First, it may be optimal 9.
from the point of view of the provider to have a queue to even out the variation Pol
in demand that he experiences, without having to invest in significant excess 10.Grossma
capacity. A shift in demand will generally cause the optimal queue length to
change (for instance, the opportunity cost of an idle moment of the supplier's 11. ,"
facilityis higher). Second, the suppliers may not be profit maximizers, so that of
206 Acton 207 Deld maximum occurs
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they do not respond to a shift in demand by charging the highest possible
monetary prices but instead allow time prices to increase. In particular,
physicians may be income satisfiers rather than maximizers. See Newhouse
(1970),. Frech and Ginsburg (1972), and Newhouse and Sloan (1972) for a
discussion of physician pricing behavior. Third, there may be a conscious
attempt to redistribute services by discriminating in favor of those with a lower
opportunity cost of time. See Nichols, Smolensky, and Tideman (1971) for a
discussion of the first and third points.
33.One form might be for several satellite clinics to be associated with a more
centrally located referral clinic.
34.This is an arc elasticity based on the elasticity calculated at the mean.
35.This calculation ignores substitution effects induced by changes in the margi-
nal tax rate implicit in the income maintenance proposals.
36.The actual money-price elasticity may be even lower than this. See Newhouse
and Phelps (1973) for a discussion of the price elasticities in several published
reports.
37.The mean values are reported first for Red Hook and second for Bedford-
Crown.
38.These assumptions are sufficient to imply that both goods are normal and that a
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As some of you may know,I have been involved in the public policy area in consumer to
regard to the financing and delivery of medical care and am not an
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e and am not an
econometrician. I greatly appreciate, therefore, the efforts of econometricians,
as represented by the paper of Jan Acton, and by others at this conference, to
determine the effect of net price on the demand for health care.
Acton's econometric analysis and empirical data about the role of time as
part of the net price paid by the consumer or potential patient,Ifeel, is long
overdue in discussions about the allocation and quality of the delivery of
medical care in the U.S. In other countries, where the financing and system of
medical care are more nationalized, the role of "waiting" in allocation has
been more obvious and is recognized. For example,.Professor Spek of the
University of Gothenburg defines "demand" for that portion of health care in
Sweden that is completely free, as follows:
Demand (active, effective) for public care is that part of the need for care which is
represented by those individuals who come in touch with the system of public care
with a desire for consultation and treatment, and who are willing to wait if this cannot
be provided at once. In each period, demand takes the form of queueing or results in
consumption. .
This is a definition of demand wholly in terms of time.
When third-party payments cover two-thirds of the U.S. total personal health
care bill, money price cannot be considered the primary allocation factor and
especially not in those areas of care—hospital and surgical—wherein third-
party payments are 92 per cent and about 70—75 per cent, respectively. In an
earlier published discussion of methods other than a price to allocate medical
care,I asked, "Would the distribution of scarce medical resources be more
optimal if all financial barriers to securing care were removed and no special
categories were set up?" and stated that "there is as much logic to implying a
high correlation between income and need for medical care throughout the
income distribution ranges as there is to implying a high correlation between
a low opportunity cost of time and need for medical care."2 It is with this public
policy approach that Ihave read Dr. Acton's paper, which develops a
consumption model and analyzes two sets of specific data re the urban poor
to test his model, which includes as variables time prices, money prices,
earned and unearned income, and as the outcome measure, physician visits.
To discuss the role of opportunity costs of time, it is necessary to consider
all different kinds of time involved in consuming health care. Although Acton's
model includes "waiting" and travel time,3it does not cover all forms of
consumption of time involved in getting medical care nor does it distinguish
between week days and weekends or after usual work hours.
In addition to the waiting time in a physician's outer office, there may be
considerable waiting in the actual examination room before seeing an M.D.
This "waiting" does not appear to be included—probably the data are
unavailable—yet in some clinics and group practices it may be a sizable
"hidden" form of waiting.
There is also the amount of time spent not in waiting but in consuming
health care, such as is involved in having examinations, X-rays, tests, and the
like. This consumption of time may be less important in initial decisions by the
consumer to seek medical care, because he may be ignorant of the sub-
209
IDemand for Health Care among the Urban Poort
sequent amount of time involved, which is largely controlled by the provider. An intere:
The more knowledgeable consumer does, however, consider this potential for the Tear
'time' in deciding whether or not to have a postponable operation, or even criticizes th
more routine care, such as an eye examination. However, from an even Kaiser'swi
broader point of view, and as stated by Michael Grossman in his Demand for "over the
Health (NBER Occasional Paper No. 119), although "a demand curve for the dissatisfacti
time spent producing health [by the consumer] could also be developed, data lengthy wai
pertaining to this input are, in general, not available" (p. 41). sonal physi
A third concept involving waitingis the time one has to wait for an Kaiser
appointment. To relegate to a footnote, as does Acton, suppliers' responses of and retainir
"increased referrals and postponement" as an alternative form of greater time cian and h
costs to the consumer is insufficient for public policy decision making. The The gene
quality of medical care and the resource costs of providing it are affected by relied almo
structuring the demand for medical care through imposing long waits for time of enr
appointments. For example, to the degree that HMO's or prepaid group quality only
practice use an appointment system, and most do, they can consciously of quality o
curtail demand by delaying appointments six weeks or two months or more for some type
check-ups and especially for specialists' care wherein explanations of delay as of
may be more acceptable to the consumer, whose ignorance exceeds in this ment of th
matter the physician's. The quality of care is less with long waits than with anticipated
short waits To the extent that the "waiting" induces subscribers to seek care and specia
elsewhere, total costs to a prepaid group are lowered. Data on voluntary The Insti
outside utilization of physician services by members of a prepaid group are medical mr
sparse and scattered and the reasons for the outside utilization are largely anemia or
unexplored. To what degree outside use of services occurs, which otherwise trying to de
would not require out-of-pocket expense to the patient because of various ity rates or,
forms of waiting,I do not know, used in thi:
Acton's paper does not incorporate into the analysis these various types of qualified b
"time," probably because the empirical data are unavailable. Econometric importance
modeling to encompass more kinds of waiting may encourage better data levels as a
collection. From the point of view of public policy, the different types of Whether
waiting time cannot be ignored and some recognition should be given these time appeE
variables even if they are not in the formal model. functioning
Recent empirical studies emphasize the importance of these, possibly its importar
nonmeasurable, inputs as follows: "Patient waiting time was longer for toothersec
nonwhites, females, poor people, and the elderly, waiting time was not related
, areas is d
to practice size but varied proportionately with use of allied health person- percentage
nel,..."in the fee-for-service sector, solo and group. of earned
To determine potential utilization, a state planning agency, New York,5 schedules,
recommends that a new prepaid group practice or HMO obtain answers to income an
such questions as: "How many waiting rooms should there be and where Probably
should they be located? (1) What will be the average length of a patient visit? time limits
(2) How many people will there be at one time in each waiting and Income Su
further, "How many consultation and examination rooms will be needed for increase a
each physician?" Obviously, HMO's, and for that matter any physician, can income, ai
structure demand by the way they answer these and other questions. comparabi
Additionally, HMO's decide how many physicians per 1,000 enrollees, ation."
number of hospital beds per 1,000 enrollees, and so on, will be provided.
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An interesting evaluation of the California Medical Group (CMG) prepared
for the Teamsters and Food Employers Security Trust Fund in LOS Angeles6
criticizes that group as having physician and hospital bed ratios far lower than
Kaiser's, which are lower than the average in California, and comments,
"over the years, Trust Funds have become increasingly aware of subscriber
dissatisfactionwithKaiser services.Difficulties making appointments,
lengthy waits to see physicians even with appointments, and hurried, imper-
sonal physician contacts are common complaints" (p. 9). For those who are
Kaiser supporters, the evaluation report recommended turning down CMG
and retaining Kaiser because obviously CMG's proposed much lower physi-
cian and hospital bed enrollee ratios would increase complaints.
The general approach of quality control in prepaid groups has, in the past,
relied almost entirely on providing the subscriber with an alternative choice at
time of enrollment, and subsequently once a year. This works to control
quality only if at least one of the alternatives provides an acceptable standard
of quality of care. This may not always be the case and there is a need for
some type of continuing review of ambulatory delivery of medical care as well
as of in-hospital care. At a minimum is input control through careful assess-
ment of the quantity of the medical care inputsin relationship to the
anticipated demand and their quality; e.g., numbers of primary physicians
and specialists, initial training and continuing education, and the like.
The Institute of Medicine's7 proposal to use selected tracers, wherein
medical inputs and health outcomes are directly related, as in iron-deficiency
anemia or middle ear infection, is worth exploring by economists who are
trying to develop better health outcome measures than mortality and morbid-
ity rates or, as in Acton's study, the number of physician visits. The latter is
used in this study without being subdivided into different types of visits nor
qualified by number of minutes. The omission of any reference to the
importance of the use of the telephone visit by persons in higher income
levels as a means of avoiding waiting is disappointing.
Whether Acton's conclusions re the "urban poor" that "travel and waiting
time appear to be operating as normal prices and that "time is already
functioning as a rationing device for demand in this New York population, and
its importance seems to exceed that of money prices,..." can be carried over
to other sectors of society as defined by income levels in urban and suburban
areas is doubtful, even if one accepts his fairly rigid assumptions. The
percentage of third-party payments of total health care costs, levels and ratios
of earned and unearned incomes, use of telephone and of appointment
schedules, level of knowledge re medical care, and so on, differ at different
income and educational levels.
Probably the most important policy inference discussed by Dr. Acton, and
time limits my discussion of it,is under "Tradeoffs of Subsidized Care and
Income Supplements," in which he states that "income maintenance will
increase aggregate medical demand for the poor" because it is non-earned
income, and concludes that "the magnitude of the change may be very
comparable over the range of subsidy and income guarantee under consider-
ation."
j
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I generally agree With Acton's arguments' about the desirability of measuring the length
the role of time in the demand for medical services. I also admire most of his ciated with
econometric work. I do not, however, like his data, or the use to which he puts must mean
these data. I am therefore extremely uneasy about his findings, particularly his is the total
principal findings of fairly high time-price elasticities of demand and ex- choice, tht
tremely low or nonexistent income elasticity of demand for medical services, be used, b
Measurement problems aside, casual empiricism suggests that the de- Acton's
mand for medical services is a function of costs other than money prices, in over time
addition to money prices. Even if we ignore the behavior of lower-income , sick leave,
groups and concentrate instead on groups having completely free medical This trend
as part of the pay package (families of military personnel are an opposite
example), we suspect that their demand for medical services are less than relativer
what they would be if they faced only zero money prices. For if the zero money incorrect.
prices represented the marginal costs, individuals facing such costs would These S
increase the consumption of medical services until the value of the last unit demand a
consumed, say, the value of their last visit to the doctor, equaled zero. Since low incom
we do riot observe such consumption behavior, it is reasonable to assume that inconsiste
the money prices do not represent the total cost of medical services, reflected i
It does not follow, however, that one can expect the time-price elasticities of ' employme
demand to be much higher (by a factor of 4 or 5) than the money-price At fault
elasticities of demand. Moreover, the nonmonetary constraints need not be this variat
exclusively or even largely those imposed by the two specific variables used rising inc(
in this study, travel to and waiting time in the office, Other important variables on the qu
that have been omitted from this study are waiting time for appointments visits to a
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(queuing time) and quality of medical services. Isuspect that there is a
positive correlation between the out-of-pocket costs and the quality of
medical services. Furthermore, if queuing time were positively correlated with
waiting time in the office, the time-price elasticities of demand would be
biased upward, or away from zero, rather than downward, as claimed by
Acton.
The travel and waiting time variables used in this study have the added
deficiency of being endogenous to the equations. This is particularly true in
the equations for the demand for private medical care.
Acton's data consist of questionnaire responses elicited from individuals
and families living in two well-defined neighborhoods in New York City. These
responses do not include information on money prices paid for medical
services or on the quality of medical services received. They do show
variability in travel and waiting time as well as variability in the number of
visits to the doctor and in the number of days of hospital care. Acton expects
and finds an inverse correlation between travel and waiting time and, say, the
number of visits to the doctor. He reasons correctly that more time spent for
medical care increases the time price of such care. He concludes from that, in
my judgment incorrectly, that this negative correlation between time and use
of medical care is a measure of the time-price elasticity of demand. This is an
incorrect conclusion because the individuals in these neighborhoods have a
choice of private physicians. This choice includes the location of the
physician and therefore the distance and time of travel from home as well as
the length of the waiting period. If an individual chooses a physician asso-
ciated with more travel and waiting time over one requiring less travel time, it
must mean that the total cost for this physician is lower, for a given quality, than
is the total cost of the lower time-price physician. In the presence of voluntary
choice, therefore, the negative relationship between time and quantity cannot
be used, by itself, to estimate the time-price elasticities of demand.
Acton's arguments about the changing role of money versus time prices
over time also ignore the secular increase in the amount of time available as
sick leave, thereby reducing an individual's time costs of medical services.
This trend is paralleled by a cross-sectional pattern of sick leave benefits
opposite to that of opportunity costs. Therefore, his conclusions about the
relative roles of time prices among income groups are probably also
incorrect.
These several factors lead me to believe that his time-price elasticities of
demand are, to say the least, extremely unreliable. His unstable but extremely
low income elasticities of demand are also highly questionable. They are
inconsistent with the rising demand for medical services over time as
reflected in the behavior of price indexes, doctors' incomes, and the growth of
employment in the medical services industry.
At fault here may be the poor quality of his dependent variable. In one case,
this variable is simply the number of visits to a doctor. However, higher or
rising income may have a greater effect on the quality of the doctor visited or
on the quality of a visit to a given doctor than it does on the number of
visits to a given doctor. This would be in line with the findings in a number
213 Demand for Health Care among the Urban Poorof studies on the demand for durable goods, including the demand for chil-
dren. All of these studies found a substantially higher quality income
elasticity of demand than quantity income elasticity of demand.
To some extent the quality effects could have been reflected in a shift from
free to non-free physician's services, with rising income. Acton's study finds
no such income effect. However,itis my impression that his dependent
variable does not truly differentiate, as claimed, between free and money- ROBER price services.
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